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Australian Taxation of Companies and Shareholders:
Imputation Arrives Down Under
Paul Von Nessen*
The recognition which has historically been afforded to the company,
unlike the trust or partnership, as an entity separate in law from its
proprietors has often complicated the taxation of companies and their
shareholders through the imposition of income tax upon both the com-
pany and its shareholders regardless of their economic interrelationship.
This double taxation of company income has increasingly been subject to
academic criticism due to the distortion which such a system (the classi-
cal system of company taxation) causes.' While alternatives to this sys-
tem of taxation of companies have been adopted in several European
countries2 and Canada, the Australian system of company taxation used
until 1985, like that in the United States, was one based upon the recog-
nition of the company as a taxable entity separate from its shareholders.3
Although there was a logical consistency to this classical system of com-
pany taxation, in order to rectify its shortcomings in achieving tax neu-
trality and equity, an increasingly complex tax statute was required. In
proposals advanced in 1985, the Australian government has indicated
that starting in 1987 the taxation of companies and shareholders in Aus-
tralia will be accomplished through a full imputation system with fea-
tures similar to that of the United Kingdom's partial imputation system.
The acceptance of full imputation as the basis for the taxation of
companies and shareholders in Australia was necessitated by the short-
comings of the classical system, particularly as it operated in Australia.
A review of the alternatives considered by the Australian government
and an examination of the system to be instituted in Australia after 1987
* Lecturer in Taxation, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia; B.A., Duke Univer-
sity, 1971; J.D., University of South Carolina, 1974; LL.M., University of Cambridge, 1979.
1 See C. McLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED T\VICE? (1979); R. GOODE, THE
CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1951); Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corpo-
rate Income Taxes, 94, HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981).
2 See Cnossen, Imputation Systems in the EEC in COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF RICHARD GOODE (1983). Imputation systems are currently in place in Belgium,
France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 'West Germany, Denmark, and Italy. Other mechanisms are
used in Sweden, Norway, Finland (dividend deduction), Austria, Portugal (split rate), Greece and
the Netherlands (partial exemption).
3 Prior to 1942, some recognition of the connection between companies and shareholders was
accorded through various credit mechanisms designed to relieve the double taxation problem.
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provide a useful insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the various
alternatives to the classical system. Additionally, the abandonment by
Australia of the former taxation regime highlights another dilemma
faced by each country which has attempted to coordinate company and
shareholder taxation. That dilemma is the acceptance of a loss of reve-
nue as a result of a reduction of total tax imposed on dividends paid to
foreign shareholders or the confrontation of the international implica-
tions of treating foreign shareholders, particularly United States nation-
als, in a discriminatory fashion. The consideration of these matters in
the Australian experience may contribute to the continued academic de-
bate concerning viable alternatives to the classical system of taxation of
companies and shareholders and, concurrently, inform those in the
United States of the potential tax consequences which may result from
equity investment in Australia.
THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA
The taxation regime in Australia under which companies have oper-
ated for over four decades4 is based upon the fundamental principal of
taxation of both the company and its shareholders. The income of the
company, calculated similarly to that of an individual, was taxed in the
hands of the company as a separate legal, and consequently a separate
taxable, entity.' In addition, a distribution of income from a company to
its shareholders by way of dividend was taxable in the hands of the share-
holders as part of their individual income.6 Despite the apparent simplic-
ity of the classical system, it proved to be deceptively complex in
application. This was due at least in part to the absence of a tax on
capital gains prior to September 15, 1985.
Several practical problems were caused by the strict separation for
tax purposes of the company and the shareholder. In particular, the diffi-
culty with maintaining consistency in the treatment of capital profits was
never adequately resolved in Australia.7 Distributions from a company
to a shareholder from proceeds of a company's capital profits were taxa-
4 The system is scheduled to be phased out during a transition period ending in 1987.
5 See Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-73, AUSTL. AcTs P. (1901-1973) [hereinafter ITAA]
§ 17 (Substituted by No. 103 § 6, 1965), amended by No. 51 § 22, 1973, imposing tax upon income
derived by any person. The definition section of ITAA § 6 indicates that "person" includes
company.
6 ITAA § 44(l)(a), amended by No. 85 § 8, 1959, No. 103 § 13, 1965, No. 51 § 22, 1973.
7 Id. § 44(1). Profit, as used in ITAA § 44(1) is a commercial concept different from income
and includes both capital and ordinary receipts which exceed the cost of the item sold. Dividends
paid from capital profits, though such profits were not assessable to the company, would be assessa-
ble to the shareholder. See Dickson v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 62 C.L.R. 687 (1939). In
F.C.T. v. Slater Holdings Ltd. (No. 2), 84 A.T.C. 4883 (1984), the inconsistency of the classical
system in this regard was displayed clearly when the High Court of Australia ruled that an increase
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ble to a shareholder if paid in cash,8 but could be received tax-free if
transferred by way of a bonus share issuance.9 Likewise, redemption of
shares, which might be thought to give rise to a tax-free capikal gain, was
treated as an income distribution 0 despite the fact that the share ceased
to exist and the proceeds could not accurately be regarded as a dividend
under corporate law." Similar difficulties were faced upon the liquida-
tion of the company." Although both redemption of shares and pay-
ment upon liquidation of a company could easily be regarded as a return
of capital, and despite the inconsistency of such an approach, the possible
manipulation of the artificial entity of the company necessitated that the
amount of the gains attributable to retained accumulated earnings be
treated as taxable to the shareholder.
The classical system which operated in Australia presented numer-
ous theoretical problems common to most systems which rely upon the
double taxation of companies and shareholders. Attempts to rectify
in the company's funds by virtue of a gift to the company should be considered as capital profits with
the result that distributions therefrom were assessable to the shareholders.
It should be noted further that capital gains under the proposed Australian capital gains tax
differ from the concept of capital profits in that capital gains will not include that portion of the
capital profits allocable to the inflation-caused increase in value of the item sold.
8 See ITAA, supra note 6, § 44(1)(a), which states, with regard to shareholders:
The assessable income of a shareholder in a company (whether the company is a resident
or non-resident shall, subject to this section and selection 128D [concerning the withhold-
ing tax] -
(a) if he is a resident - income dividends paid to him by the company out of profits de-
rived by it from any source; and
(b) if he is non-resident - include dividends paid to him by the company to the extent to
which they are paid out of profits derived by it from sources in Australia.
9 The issuance of bonus shares not representing a capitalization of profits were not assessable if
issued pursuant to the provisions of Id., § 444 (2) (substituted by No. 165 § 8, 1973), which allowed
such issuances from non-taxable capital profits or revaluation of capital assets.
10 See id. §§ 6(4) and 44(B) (Inserted by 85 § 8, 1967). The First section expanded the defini-
tion of a dividend to include any return of capital on a share in excess of its paid-up value whether
the share continued to exist or not. Section 44(B) deemed moneys or property paid by a company in
such circumstances (and also in circumstances where such payments were made from share pre-
mium accounts) to be paid out of profits.
11 F.C.T. v. Uther, 112 CLR 630 (1965). Such a payment was not considered a dividend due to
the statutory definition of dividend then in force, which reflected the substantive company law
concept.
12 ITAA, supra note 6, § 47 indicates that distributions to shareholders in winding up shall be
deemed to be dividends to the extent to which they represent income derived by the company not
applied to replace loss of paid-up capital. The difficulty of applying this section are illustrated in
Gibb v. F.C.T., 118 C.L.R. 628 1966), 118 C.L.R. 628 concerning a § 47 distribution made from a
company which had received a bonus share issuance pursuant to § 44(2), and Harrowell v. F.C.T.,
116 C.L.R. 607 (1967), dealing with a company making a § 47 distribution after having itself re-
ceived such a distribution from a subsidiary. These decisions concentrated on whether the term
"income" in § 47 meant income by ordinary concepts or income as defined and expanded by virtue
of the provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act.
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these shortcomings often resulted in solutions which displayed undesir-
able levels of complexity. For example, the policies which were served
by the progressive taxation of individuals were generally not served by
the use of progressive rates for companies (often made up of numerous
small investors). Likewise, the use of several companies in varying com-
binations and structures not only made the use of progressive rates inap-
propriate,13 but also presented difficulties from multiple taxation of
companies as dividends flowed from one company to another before ar-
riving ultimately in the hands of an individual shareholder. As a result,
double taxation and progressivity were maintained in Australia by assess-
ment of a non-progressive tax at the company level, while the progres-
sive rate structure was maintained for individual taxation. A dividend
rebate mechanism" insured that dividends could pass between Austra-
lian companies without the imposition of additional taxation, thus main-
taining the principle that tax should be imposed at most twice on income
originally earned by a company and ultimately distributed to an
individual.
The maintenance of a single rate for company tax in conjunction
with progressive rates for individuals resulted in the use of companies as
tax shelters for taxpayers in higher marginal tax rates than those imposed
upon companies. In 1985, for example, the highest rate individual tax-
payer who chose to operate through a company could reduce the imme-
diate tax imposed on the income so earned from the highest personal rate
(60%) to the company tax rate (46%), an immediate saving of 14% of
income earned. The income earned by the company would potentially be
subject to the additional personal tax upon distribution to the share-
holder, but the benefit of the initial tax savings was maximized when the
additional tax which would be incurred upon distribution of company
dividends to the individual could be deferred for significant periods (for
example where the company needed to accumulate working capital) or
incurred when the recipient was in a low income year. Due to the lack of
capital gains tax, the use of companies as tax shelters for high rate indi-
vidual taxpayers proved particularly advantageous in Australia especially
since this potential liability was often avoidable through realization upon
13 This was discovered in Australia when, as in the United States, increasing tax rates were
imposed in increments on company income. Tax avoidance was facilitated through the use of nu-
merous companies for income splitting.
14 ITAA, supra note 6, § 46(3) provided a rebate for taxes attributable to inter-company divi-
dends. This rebate on taxes was calculated by multiplying the total dividends received by the aver-
age rate of tax paid by the recipient company upon the entirety of its taxable income. Inter-company
dividends paid from one private company to another were normally subject to only half of the rebate
for reasons related to the avoidance of the minimum distribution requirements of Division 7 of the
ITAA. However, where the Federal Commissioner of Taxation concluded that dividends paid to a
private company would, during the year, ultimately be distributed to an individual, he could allow
the full rebate under ITAA § 46(3).
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sale of the company shares of the accumulation of those earnings in a
tax-free capital gain.15
CONSTRAINTS ON COMPANIES AS TAX SHELTERS
In order to limit the use of companies as tax shelters, Australia im-
posed an undistributed profits tax upon private companies16 which did
not fall under the Australian definition of public companies. Public com-
panies, defined primarily to include companies whose shares are listed on
a stock exchange,17 were considered less susceptible to use as tax shelters
and were consequently not subjected to the tax. The undistributed prof-
its tax prevented private companies from retaining excessive after-tax
earnings by establishing an amount of each year's corporate income
which could be retained by the company. This amount was calculated by
applying a statutory percentage to each designated class of net income
(eg. property income, trading income, dividends from private companies,
dividends from public companies). 8 These percentages were set at levels
15 The difficulty of detecting indirect benefits conferred by shareholder use of the company
assets also added to the potential benefits of the company as a tax shelter. The taxation of companies
and shareholders based upon the imposition of tax at both the company and individual level necessi-
tated several protection provisions to assure that the income earned by a company would be taxed
twice upon enjoyment by an individual. Of primary concern were methods by which the controllers
of small companies could enjoy the benefit of company earnings without the direct declaration of a
dividend. In order to assure the integrity of the doubt taxation system, loans to shareholders and
payments to directors and shareholders of companies were deemed top be dividend distributions in
certain circumstances, thus insuring that tax would be imposed at both the shareholder and com-
pany level. These provisions, applying only to private companies, are located in ITAA Id.
§§ 108(A), amended by 90 § 7, 1962 (substituted by No. 85 § 16, 1989), 1989, 109, amended by No.
90 § 7, 1982 (substituted by No. 85 § 16, 1989). Enforcement of these provisions, as might be ex-
pected, was somewhat difficult.
16 ITAA, Div. 7.
17 Id, § 163A(2) amended by No. 51 § 22, 1973 (substituted by No. 216 § 3, 1973). Section
103 A(2) includes in its definition of public companies:
(a) companies whose shares, not being shares entitled to a fixed dividend, are listed on a
stock exchange;
(b) a cooperative;
(c) a non-profit company; or
(d) companies which are
(1) mutual life assurance companies;
(2) friendly society dispensaries;
(3) registered trade unions, friendly societies, and employee organizations;
(4) a state, commonwealth, or territory organization but which is not a company under
the laws of the state, commonwealth or territory;
(5) a company controlled by a Government or by an entity included in (4) above;
(6) a subsidiary of a public company.
Further limitations on the definition of a public company are found in Id., § 103A(3) amended by
No. 51 § 22, 1973, preventing companies with concentration of ownership from being so classified,
and id. § 103A(3A), clarifying the applicability of the definition in the case of subsidiaries.
18 Id. § 105B (substituted by No. 165 § 23, 1973). The retention allowance in 1986 for trading
1987]
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intended to make private companies less attractive as tax shelters
through required annual dividend distributions. 19 The required distribu-
tion for each year was calculated by the amount of income (net of income
tax) less permitted retention, with the tax imposed upon insufficient dis-
tributions in each year equal to half of the amount which had not been
distributed to shareholders within the year 20 as required.21
The fear of use of private companies as tax shelters also resulted in
special treatment to them through elimination of cumulative taxation of
inter-company dividends. In keeping with the policy of allowing maxi-
mum flexibility to businesses in their decision as to which form to utilize
and how to carry on business, the tax imposed upon inter-company divi-
dends was eliminated. This was accomplished, as previously mentioned
through a tax rebate for the amount of income tax paid which was alloca-
ble to dividends received from other companies.22
Private companies presented certain difficulties because the use of a
string of private companies could possibly circumvent the undistributed
profits tax by cumulating the periods allowed for making the necessary
distributions.23  Consequently, the dividend rebate allowed for distribu-
tions from one private company to another private company was limited
to one half of the tax allocable to that income.24 Furthermore, all divi-
dends between private companies were required to be distributed by the
recipient company (as no retention allowance applied25) or be subject to
the undistributed profits tax.
income was set at 80% of the trading income net of allocable expenses and income tax. Public
company dividends and property income were likewise established as 10% of the net income in those
categories. No retention allowance was provided for dividends from one private company to an-
other. The retention allowance for trading income increased from 70% to 80% in 1982.
19 The retention allowance of 70% in force prior to 1982 resulted in a company's being sub-
jected to a total tax liability of 54.1% on trading income fully retained. In addition to the 46%
primary company tax, a company retaining all its after-tax profits consisting of trading income
would be subject to the excess retention tax of 8.1% of pre-tax profits, equal to half of the amount
remaining after payment of primary tax (I less 46% = 54%) and allowance for retention (54% less
70% of 54% = 16.2%). This effectively reduced the potential benefit of such a shelter; however,
with the retention allowance at 80%, the total tax liability for fully retained trading profits was
reduced to 51.4%. The total tax incidence on retained property income exceeded 70% under full
retention, making distribution desirable when earnings included a substantial amount of this type of
income.
20 The appropriate period during which the distributions were permitted to be made was the
period beginning two months before the end of the tax year and ending ten months after the end of
the tax year. ITAA, supra note 6, § 103(1).
21 Id. § 104(1) amended by No. 90 § 17, 1982 (substituted by No. 51 § 22, 1973).
22 Id., § 46 (substituted by No. I10 § 10, 1964).
23 By use of such companies in tandem, dividends could be paid at the end of each successive
distribution period (which ended ten months after the tax year-end) enabling indefinite postpone-
ment of any distribution to an individual.
24 Id., § 46(2)(a).
25 Id., § 105B (substituted by No. 165 § 23, 1973).
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TAX AVOIDANCE IN THE CLAsSIcAL AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM
Despite efforts to eliminate the use of companies as tax shelters, high
marginal rate individual taxpayers were effectively able to continue to use
companies in Australia to avail themselves of the lower marginal tax
rates of companies so long as profits could be accumulated at the com-
pany level and the tax upon distribution could be avoided. To these
ends, various means of both circumventing the undistributed profits tax
and avoiding the taxation of the dividend distribution developed. To
avoid the undistributed profits tax, companies were structured to avoid
characterization as a private company.26 Legislative amendments to the
definition of public companies effectively eliminated such efforts.2 7 At-
tempts to avoid the tax on dividend distributions, however, provided
greater scope for originality and thus proved much more difficult to regu-
late. Additionally, the absence of a capital gains tax increased the attrac-
tiveness of most tax avoidance schemes.
The techniques for avoiding the personal tax upon distribution of
company profits in Australia, as elsewhere, relied upon the ability of the
shareholder to realize, through the sale of his shares, the value of the
retained profits of the company as capital gains. Certain share purchas-
ers, such as those who had incurred, expected to incur, or could artifi-
cially generate (by means discussed below) losses during the current year,
could distribute the accumulated earnings of purchased companies with-
out concern for the tax liability brought about by such a distribution.
These purchasers, by taking advantage of their tax position, could
purchase shares at nearly the full value of the asset backing of each share
and avoid the substantial discount for the tax liability which might nor-
mally be expected. Similarly, purchasers who were not planning a distri-
bution in the foreseeable future had no reason to discount fully the price
they were willing to pay for such shares. Because of these possibilities
(which would allow a shareholder to realize the full benefit of the earn-
ings retained in their companies through the sale of shares to such pur-
chasers), numerous artificial tax avoidance schemes developed to enable
26 See e.g. F.C.T. v. Cappid Pty. Ltd., 127 C.L.R. 140 (1971), Nadir Pty Ltd. v. F.C.T., 129
C.L.R. 595 (1971), Luceria Investments Pty Ltd v. F.C.T., 6 A.L.R. 116 (1975), and F.C.T. v.
Casuarina, 127 C.L.R. 62 (1970). Of the numerous variants of these avoidance techniques, two are
noteworthy as examples. The first was to structure a company so that the shareholders, normally
nominees of the real parties in interest, were prevented under the company documents from receiv-
ing any of the company profits. The real parties in interest were listed as potential objects of the
company's generosity. While the company could then be described as not being formed for profit (at
least not as usually understood), these schemes, as might be expected, received little judicial support.
The second variant was the use of partially owned subsidiaries of public instrumentalities (both being
defined as public companies due to the provisions relating to the subsidiaries of public companies).
Though initially successful, this second type was eliminated by legislative changes.
27 See ITAA § 103A, subsections 3A, 3B, 4, 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, and 4E.
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shareholders of private companies to receive, without great difficulty, the
retained earnings of the company as tax-free capital gains rather than as
dividends. Unfortunately, the benign response of the Australian courts
to these schemes accelerated the growth of their popularity.
In the case of Slutzkin v. FCT,28 the High Court of Australia consid-
ered the primary scheme for the transformation of profits into capital
gains known as the dividend strip, and accepted its validity.29 In the
Australian version of the dividend strip, a shareholder would sell his
shares to a share trader who would pay for the shares with the proceeds
of dividend distributions from the newly purchased company (often ac-
complished with an artificial transfer of checks). The shares were then
sold by the share trader at a loss equivalent to the dividend, and enabled
the former shareholder of the private company to obtain the after-tax
company earnings from his company without further tax liability for
either the selling shareholder or the share trader."0 In the Australian
context, dividend strips were not only used to enable shareholders to re-
ceive tax-free earnings upon termination of their shareholding interest in
the private company, but they were also used, though less successfully, to
avoid the tax on excess retention through the sale of special rights
shares.'
While the Slutzkin scheme and its various refinements made the use
of companies advantageous to individual taxpayers whose marginal indi-
28 Slutzkin v. F.C.T., 140 C.L.R. 314 (1977).
29 The High Court refused to apply s 260, Australia's general anti-avoidance section at the
time, in Slutzkin, supra note 28, and Patcorp Investments Ltd. v. F.C.T., 140 C.L.R. 247 (1976). It
preferred instead to look at the steps in the dividend stripping scheme in isolation to avoid the
conclusion that the purpose of the scheme was the avoidance of tax. Slutzkin concentrated upon the
sale of shares while Patcorp centered upon the operations of the share trader in the inquiry as to
whether tax avoidance was found. Neither step, in isolation, was indicative of tax avoidance.
30 Indeed, the dividend rebate to a share trading company might also make the transaction
extremely attractive by enabling it to generate artificial losses for its own benefit. The elimination of
rebates on dividends paid in dividend stripping operations was accomplished through the adoption
of ITAA § 46A in 1978.
31 These schemes were similar to a preferred stock bail out, but the necessity to replace the
capital so removed often resulted in the entire transaction appearing even more obviously like a
sham. See, eg. Newton v. F.C.T., 98 C.L.R. 1 (1958), in which the Privy Council (to which certain
Australian appeals were permitted until 1986) used the general anti-avoidance section of the Austra-
lian Income Tax Assessment Act to strike down such a dividend strip in a case originating in New
South Wales.
The High Court of Australia, which was an alternative ultimate court of appeal for decisions
from State Supreme Courts in Australia (the right of appeal from the High Court to the Privy
Council was limited in 1968 and abolished in 1975), began to display a less interventionist approach
to the use of the anti-avoidance statute, § 260 of the ITAA, with the advent of Chief Justice Sir
Garfield Barwick in 1964. While the jurisprudence of the High Court during this era was the subject
of great criticism, this aspect of the tax environment in Australia is beyond the purview of this
article. In this regard, however, see Lehmann, The Income Tax Judgments of Sir Garfield Barwick.
A Study in the Failure of the New Legalism, 9 MONASH L. REv. 115 (1983).
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vidual rates were above the company rates by effectively eliminating the
personal tax on dividend distributions, later developments were of even
more universal appeal. They were targeted to avoid all tax on income
earned through companies. After the Slutzkin case, tax avoidance pro-
moters relied upon the High Court of Australia's legal analysis of the
basic dividend strip to promote avoidance schemes under which the pay-
ment by the company of even primary company tax upon earnings could
be avoided. Where the dividend strip occurred prior to the assessment 32
of company tax upon the stripped company, the amount stripped from
the company would include all pre-tax earnings for the year. In order for
the share trader to realize its loss on the sale of the stripped company's
shares and to insulate itself from any liability for the mismanagement of
the stripped company (having, as it did after the strip, no assets but a
large contingent tax liability), the shares were sold to straw men who
deposited the company records at the "bottom of the harbour. '33
Although this scheme culminated in legislation which imposed tax liabil-
ity equivalent to the lost company tax, directly upon shareholders who
sold the shares in such circumstances, 34 companies continued to provide
an attractive tax shelter through use of the basic dividend strip.
THEORETICAL INADEQUACY OF THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM
Models for taxation are usually judged on the basis of their accom-
plishment of certain objectives, such as neutrality, efficiency and equity.
The Australian system of company tax used prior to 1985 had several
major shortcomings when judged by these criteria.35
The first obvious problem with the former company tax was its lack
of equity among potential investors. Since a single tax rate was imposed
32 Self-assessment in Australia has been introduced for years subsequent to the 1984-85 tax
year, however even 1985-86 is a transitional year due to the administration difficulties involved.
Under the prior scheme, the tax liability arose only upon assessment by the tax authorities based
upon information reported by the taxpayer.
33 The scheme originally developed in Sydney, where the Sydney Harbour provided a large
depository for such company records, at least figuratively. The men of straw were often individuals
recruited because their departure from Australia was imminent. Relying upon the view that a share-
holder need not be concerned with any transaction which took place after the shares had been sold
(from Slutzkin v. F.C.T., supra note 28), both the shareholders and the dividend strippers were able
to argue that any liability should not fall upon them. The scheme, originally discovered because of
the failure of such companies to comply with requirements under corporate rather than tax law,
came to be known as a "wet Slutzkin" as opposed to the normal dividend strip, the "dry Slutzkin."
34 Taxation (Unpaid Company Tax) Assessment Act 1982, Taxation (Unpaid Company Tax-
Vendors) Act 1982, and Taxation (Unpaid Company Tax-Promoters) Act 1982. Liability was im-
posed on a shareholder who sold shares in a company for an amount in excess of the asset backing of
the company less any potential tax liability where the tax liability was ultimately not paid by the
purchaser.
35 The deficiencies of the Australian company tax are well reported in Krever, Companies,
Shareholders and Tax Reform, 20 Taxation in Australia 163 (1985).
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upon companies, shareholders with different marginal tax rates faced
substantially different consequences from the use of companies as an in-
vestment medium. Lower rate taxpayers invariably faced increased taxa-
tion as the company tax itself could not be avoided (although the amount
of increase might vary upon the treatment of company earnings). High
rate taxpayers, on the other hand, faced either an increase or decrease in
tax rate depending upon the disposition of the company earnings. The
retention of post-company tax earnings at the company level followed by
subsequent transformation of these earnings into tax free gains by a sale
of shares would result in a decrease in the marginal tax rate to the indi-
vidual. The distribution of dividends by the company to the individual,
however, would result in the imposition of both the company tax and the
individual tax which, would in turn, result in an increase of the effective
marginal tax rate of the individual.
As a necessary corollary to the above principle, the classical system
biased the decision-making processes and resulting resource allocation of
the economy in several ways. It inhibited the efficient working of the free
market economy by placing artificial incentives or disincentives upon de-
cisions which were best made by reference only to commercial considera-
tions. This bias of the Australian classical system was evidenced in a
number of ways, the most obvious of which was in the system's inherent
incentive for companies to retain earnings rather than to distribute them.
This bias resulted in economic inefficiency through the encouragement of
fund retention by less economically productive companies merely be-
cause of the tax disincentive to distribute profits.
Due to the double taxation of company profits and distributions, the
classical system also greatly affected the choice of investment venue
which would more appropriately be made with regard to the economic
and legal characteristics of such venue. This particular bias would cause
investment through partnerships and trusts in situations where, but for
the tax implications, company form would be chosen. As a further con-
sequence, existing companies were at a disadvantage in competing for
equity funding with potentially less efficient businesses because of the
comparative tax advantage enjoyed through use of the alternative forms.
Finally, the classical system resulted in a bias against equity financ-
ing and in favor of debt financing for companies. While interest pay-
ments made by a company could properly be deducted from its income
(with imposition of a tax at the investor level alone), amounts distributed
as dividends had to be made from company after-tax earnings and were
also taxable to the shareholder. The imposition of the additional tax
upon the income earned through equity financing induced investors to
minimize their equity investment by thinly capitalizing companies. The
result was that capital committed to companies was determined more by
Vol. 19:73
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reference to taxation consequences than by proper financial
considerations.
The biases of the Australian tax system for companies and share-
holders were quite apparent by 1985. In its "Draft White Paper," (Re-
form of the Australian Tax System)36 the Australian Federal Government
recognized that the classical system utilized in Australia caused an equity
problem not because of the double taxation but because the taxation sys-
tem was dependent upon the dividend payout policy of each company.37
As a direct result of taxation being dependent upon company dividend
policy, companies could tailor their dividend policies (and consequently
minimize tax) according to the taxation position of the proprietors.38
The inefficiency costs were reflected in corporate structures and financing
decisions based primarily upon taxation consequences were apparent.39
In response to this system, companies with minimal capital (usually two
dollars) became commonplace. Likewise, the use of trading trusts (usu-
ally a trust which has a corporate trustee so as to maintain limited liabil-
ity for the beneficiaries) proliferated and so enabled investors to reap the
benefits of the company form without the attendant increased tax liabil-
ity. Even large businesses were organized as unit trusts to avoid the
double taxation imposed upon companies. 4°
Possible alternatives to the classical system of taxation of companies
and shareholders have twice been proposed recently in Australia. In
1975, the report of the Taxation Review Committee (the Asprey Re-
port)4" had included proposals that a split rate or imputation system re-
place the classical system. These proposals were not implemented due to
a change in government in November, 1975. In 1981, the report of the
Committee of Enquiry into the Australian Financial System (the Camp-
bell Report) 2 had proposed that full integration of the personal and cor-
porate tax rates be accomplished and that companies should be allowed,
in certain circumstances, to be taxed as partnerships. The 1985 Draft
White Paper, incorporating many of the findings and proposals of both
the Asprey and Campbell Committees, indicated that in 1985 the Austra-
lian Federal Government was considering full integration, a split rate
36 REFORM OF THE AUSTRALIAN TAX SYSTEM (Canberra: Australian Government Printing
Service, 1985).
37 Id. at 1 17.4.
38 Id. at 1 17.5.
39 Id. at 1 17.6.
40 All of this was acknowledged in the "Draft White Paper" at II 16.5, 17.7 and 17.8.
41 K. Asprey (Chairman), FULL REPORT OF THE TAXATION REVIEW COMMITTEE (Canberra:
Australian Government Printing Service, 1975) [Hereinafter Asprey Report].
42 J. Campbell, COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, FINAL
REPORT (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1981) [Hereinafter Campbell Report].
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system, or an imputation system as possible options for the reform of the
system for taxation of companies and shareholders in Australia.
ALTERNATIVES
Most of the techniques developed and implemented by other nations
to improve upon the classical system of taxation of companies and share-
holders were considered by the Australian law reformers. Unfortunately,
many of the methods considered, most of which provided for the elimina-
tion of either the tax upon the shareholder or the tax upon the company
profits, were nevertheless considered inappropriate for Australia because
of the loss of revenues which would result from their implementation or
because they retained certain of the imperfections of the classical system.
Both the Asprey and Campbell Committees made reform proposals
which drew heavily upon overseas experience in the elimination of the
double taxation of the classical system. Although numerous variants of
each general proposal considered for Australia have emerged in aca-
demic discussion and in practice worldwide,43 a review of the specific
reforms which were considered indicates the broad nature of the Austra-
lian enquiries which culminated in the reforms of 1985.
Split Rate (Dividend Deduction)
One simple means of eliminating the double taxation of distributions
from companies is to allow a deduction from company income for divi-
dends distributed to individual taxpayers. This system, similar to the tax
system imposed upon trusts in Australia, would result in only one level
of taxation upon company income depending upon whether it was re-
tained by the company or distributed to shareholders. A less successful
method of correlating the tax on companies and shareholders is to pro-
vide different tax rates for company income retained by the company and
income distributed to shareholders.' This concept was tried in West
Germany prior to 1977, that is, before that country's introduction of an
imputation system in that year. As discussed by the Asprey Commit-
tee,45 either method would reduce the bias against corporate equity in-
vestment where income was distributed (completely eliminating such
43 For a detailed analysis of the alternatives see Warren, The Relation and Integration of Indi-
vidual and Corporate Income Taxes, supra note 1. See also Cnossen, Alternative Forms of Corpora-
tion Tax, t AUSTL. TAX FORUM 253 (1984), and K. LAHEY AND S. SALTER, IMPUTATION
ALTERNATIVES FOR AUSTRALIA (Melbourne: Comparative Tax Policy Research Institute, 1981).
44 This system would be equivalent to allowing only a partial deduction for dividends distrib-
uted and would be exposed to the same criticisms as the dividend deduction system while retaining
certain of the shortcomings of the classical system. It may best be considered as a compromise
between the classical and dividend deduction system, probably proposed to limit the loss of revenues
which would occur by elimination entirely of one level of tax upon corporate earnings.
45 Asprey Report, supra note 41, at 16.33.
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bias under the dividend deduction). However, both variants retain the
imperfection of the classical system due to the ability of a company, to
alter the tax incidence through appropriate dividend distribution policy.
Conflict among shareholders who are in different tax brackets might also
result because high income individual shareholders could be benefited by
the retention of income by the company whereas low income individuals
might prefer distribution (depending upon the tax rates and the differen-
tial between the tax on undistributed and distributed income). Overall,
this underlying lack of neutrality between different level individual tax-
payers in respect of dividend policy reduces the attractiveness of this
alternative.
Dividend Exemption
By exempting the dividend from the income of the individual tax-
payer, several of the negative effects of double taxation may be avoided.
Like most alternatives to the classical system, this proposal would elimi-
nate one of the two levels of taxation; in this case it is the tax at the
shareholder level. Such a proposal would reduce the tax bias against
company investment by lowering the tax incidence of company invest-
ment caused by double taxation and would eliminate the inducement for
shareholders to retain earnings in the company. Although this system
might result in a slight bias toward distribution because of the lack of any
tax at the shareholder level, the greater fault with such a taxation regime
is its obvious advantage to high level taxpayers. Under this system, in-
vestment in companies would be attractive only to individuals with tax
rates in excess of the company - imposed rate. Low rate taxpayers would
continue to be inhibited from entering the share markets, and biases in
the proper business structure to be utilized would be retained.
Although attempts to rectify the lack of progressiveness of this alter-
native have been attempted through the provision of partial exemptions,
these attempts have been ineffective in situations where the company tax
rate remains higher than the lower individual rates. In Australia, a par-
tial rebate, rather than an exemption, was used between 1982 and 1983,
thereby limiting the advantage enjoyed by shareholders in higher margi-
nal tax rates.46 Either a limited rebate of the kind used in Australia be-
tween 1982 and 1983, or a partial exemption system provides greater
neutrality among taxpayers in different marginal rates than does a total
exemption of dividends in the shareholders' hands. Unfortunately, a par-
tial exemption or limited rebate system accomplishes this with certain
imprecision and is consequently only marginally more attractive in the-
46 ITAA § 46C. The rebate (approximately 30%) applied to the first $1,000 of eligible divi-
dends. The taxpayer was entitled to a reduction of his tax liability (which was based upon income
inclusive of dividends) by the amount of the rebate.
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ory than the total exemption system.47
Conduit
Perhaps the simplest means of eliminating the distortions caused by
the classical company tax system is to eliminate the company tax alto-
gether and to impose a tax upon the individual shareholder regardless of
whether company earnings have been distributed to the shareholders or
not. This method is similar to the tax treatment afforded to partnerships
in Australia and is available as an alternative taxation system for small
corporations in the United States.48 Although this method of taxation
would eliminate the relative disadvantage of company investment in rela-
tion to other investment structures due to the double tax upon companies
and would also assure that company investment would be equally attrac-
tive to high and low level individual taxpayers, it does suffer from one
rather important deficiency. Under a conduit system, the incentive to
distribute company earnings is great as each shareholder is faced with a
tax liability upon company earnings whether the company has made dis-
tributions or not. This leads to a bias against earnings retention despite
any underlying economic justification. Finally, the administrative diffi-
culties which a conduit system might necessitate (particularly where nu-
merous individual returns include a portion of the company's income)
make this method of taxation appropriate, as in the United States, only
for companies with a limited number of shareholders. Both the Asprey
and Campbell Committees supported the provision of this option for pri-
vate companies with fewer than ten shareholders and only one class of
shares49; however, this proposal was never implemented due to a desire
for a more comprehensive reform.
47 Another alternative integration method based upon the deduction of capital investments has
been proposed by economic theorists upon the assumption that allowing such a deduction to a tax-
payer and taxing the taxpayer on all receipts from the investment and upon gains realised upon
disinvestment is the same, so long as tax rates remain constant, as an exemption on after-tax invest-
ment income. This method, while eliminating the double tax bias against companies, would be the
same as eliminating the individual tax level if the deduction were permitted to be taken by the
individual shareholder in his share investment. Consequently, this system would suffer from the
same draw backs which were explored under the dividend exemption proposals. A refinement of the
approach is to allow the capital investment deduction to the company on its capital investments.
This would eliminate the double taxation at the company level with the resultant incentive toward
retention even greater than under the classical system due to the imposition of tax for the first time
only upon receipt in the shareholders' hands. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash FLow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) and Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-type or
Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975).
48 I.R.C. § 1201.




Full integration, the preferred alternative of the Campbell Commit-
tee in 1981,50 entirely eliminates the double taxation of company and
shareholders. Under this system, as with the conduit system, the income
of each shareholder includes a portion of the income earned by the com-
pany regardless of whether it is in fact distributed; however, unlike the
conduit system, the company pays tax upon the company income. This
tax payment by the company is considered as a prepayment or withhold-
ing, taken by the company on behalf of the shareholders, who must pay
tax upon their proportionate share of company income in the year in
which it is earned by the company whether or not it has been distributed.
While many of the administrative difficulties of the conduit system re-
main, they are somewhat reduced by the prepayment aspect of full inte-
gration. Despite the theoretical benefits of full integration outlined by the
Campbell Committee, the Australian government concluded in 1984 that
such a system would not be feasible primarily due to the loss of revenue
which such a scheme would entail. Furthermore, the Australian govern-
ment pointed to the administrative difficulties which such a system
would present as grounds for refusing to implement full integration of
company and shareholder taxation for all companies.5 "
Imputation Systems
The final taxation system which eliminates the double taxation of
company earnings is the imputation system. This system, of which the
post-1986 Australian company tax is an example, imposes a tax upon
company earnings alone. Distributions to shareholders of after-tax com-
pany profits give rise to income to the shareholders not only to the extent
of the net dividend distributions, but also to the extent of the proportion-
ate share of the tax collected at the company level (which also becomes
available as a credit against the shareholder's personal tax liability).
Imputation systems fall into two categories: partial imputation sys-
tems and full imputation systems. A full imputation system treats the
distribution to the shareholder as consisting of the dividend actually re-
ceived plus the entire company tax already paid on the profits from
which the dividend distribution was made, which is also to be used by the
shareholder and applied against his own individual tax liability. Thus,
50 Campbell Report, supra note 42, at 308.
51 In its White Paper, REFORM OF THE AUSTRALIAN TAX SYSTEM, supra note 36, the Austra-
lian government mentioned, at 17.32, in addition to lost revenue:
1. Delay in filing of individual returns where company income was relevant;
2. Difficulties where final assessment of a company return necessitated amendment
of numerous shareholder returns; and
3. Difficulties where more than one class of shares was involved.
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the tax paid by the company is fully imputed to the shareholders upon
distribution.
By way of example, if the company tax rate is set at 30%, the
amount of post-company tax income available to be paid by the company
(assuming no difference between financial and assessable income) would
be 70% of pre-tax income. Should this amount be entirely distributed,
the total assessable distributions to the company's shareholders under a
full imputation system would equal the entire pre-tax income of the com-
pany. The latter is made up of the dividend distributions plus imputed
income equal to the total tax paid by the company and allocable to the
income distributed." z Where companies earn income which is not subject
to full taxation, however, adjustment mechanisms are required to prevent
super-imputation. Super-imputation is the allowance of a greater credit
than is warranted from the tax paid by the company on income which is
either exempt or taxed at lower rates. The problem of super-imputation
is discussed below.
The advantages of the full imputation system are fairly obvious.
The system eliminates the double taxation of earnings which are received
by the individual taxpayer by giving a credit for all taxes paid upon the
income to the company when the income is received, by way of dividend
distribution, to the individual shareholder. The system maintains taxa-
tion of the earnings irrespective of whether distribution has taken place.
Neutrality between high and low level taxpayers is achieved for distrib-
uted earnings; however, undistributed earnings enable high marginal rate
shareholders to postpone tax where company rates are below the highest
individual rates. Likewise there is a tax inducement for individual tax-
payers in marginal rates under the company rate to seek distributions of
company earnings because they are faced with excessive tax prepayment
while the earnings are retained by the company.
An alternative to the full imputation system is the partial imputa-
tion system. Under this system only a certain portion of the tax paid at
the company level is attributed to the shareholders upon dividend distri-
bution. Thus the partial imputation system, like the split rate system, is
a compromise between full imputation and the classical system. Yet the
partial imputation system retains taxation at the company level despite
the amount of distributions made by the company. The basic disadvan-
tages of distortion against company investment in relation to other in-
vestment venues and the bias toward debt investment, though reduced,
nonetheless remain. Despite this, the Asprey Committee recommended
52 In order to determine any shareholder's assessable income as a result of a dividend distribu-
tion, the dividend received need merely be divided by 70% in this example (1 less the tax rate).
Likewise, to get the additional amount to be imputed to any shareholder, one need only multiply the
dividend received by the ratio of 30/70 (the tax rate over the remainder).
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in 1981 that Australia move to a partial imputation system. This recom-
mendation was motivated largely by the introduction of such systems in
Canada and the United Kingdom.53
1987 AUSTRALIAN COMPANY/SHAREHOLDER TAXATION
In proposals advanced by the Treasurer, Mr. Keating, in September,
1985, the Australian government committed itself to the elimination of
the double taxation of company earnings. While certain portions of the
tax package, particularly the new capital gains tax,54 met with strong
objections from the opposition parties, the general thrust of the company
tax reforms were warmly received. While the exact details of the reform
of the company tax have been altered several times since the government
committed itself to an imputation system in 1985, the basic components
of the system, introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament on April
2, 1987, as the Taxation Laws Amendment (Company Distributions) Bill
1987, have remained unchanged.
The cornerstone of the new Australian company tax will be the
elimination of the double tax upon companies by the adoption of a full
imputation system. Taxation will be imposed upon companies at a flat
49% company tax rate upon the taxable earnings (and taxable capital
gains) of the company. When a company distributes dividends to its
shareholders from income which has been subject to company tax, the
shareholder will recognize as income both the income represented by the
net dividend distribution as well as the allocable company tax paid upon
the portion of the company earnings which that dividend represents. To
offset this additional non-cash imputed income, the shareholder will be
allowed a credit against his tax liability to the extent of the imputed in-
come. In effect, the company tax which is paid is considered to be a
prepayment made by the company for its shareholders on the income
which is distributed to them.55 Thus, the income received by the share-
holder includes both the dividend actually received and the appropriate
53 Asprey Report, supra note 41, at 16.52.
54 The new capital gains tax, found in the Income Tax Assessment Act, part 3A, operates upon
capital assets acquired after Sept. 19, 1985. The gain on each item is calculated by reducing its sales
price by the cost adjusted for inflation where the asset has been held for more than one year. Net
gains on all assets are included in income for the year with a provision for averaging. Losses on each
item are calculated on an adjusted cost basis without reference to inflation, but must be used only to
reduce capital gains in the year incurred or in following years. Personal use assets are not grouped
with other assets, but gains on these assets (net of losses which may be allowed in certain circum-
stances) are likewise included in assessable income.
For a description of the company taxation implications of the new Australian capital gains tax,
see Krever, Companies, Shareholders, and Capital Gains Taxation, 3 Australian Tax Forum 267
(1986).
55 See Taxation Laws Amendment (Company Distributions) Bill 1987 [hereinafter "Company
Distributions Bill"] § 14, proposed ITAA § 160 AQT. This differs from full integration in that the
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portion of the prepayment which can be used as a credit against the indi-
vidual shareholder's tax liability.
Another proposed modification of the tax system, independent of
the imputation changes but clearly related to the overall scheme is the
alignment of the company tax rate with the top personal rate. This rela-
tionship is discussed below. The company tax rate to be imposed repre-
sents a rise of 3% from the 46% rate of tax upon company assessable
income imposed under the classical system, with the new 49% rate to be
initially imposed upon company income for the 1986-87 tax year. The
individual marginal rates have been reduced so that the highest individ-
ual tax rate shall be only 49% in the period 1987-88, thereby bringing the
company tax rate into line with the top individual tax rate. The imputa-
tion of credit and income to the individual taxpayer shall apply for the
period 1987-88 as well, with the result that the full imputation system
will be in place in its entirety from that date.
The operation of the Australian imputation system can be explained
through an example which uses income earned by a company (after full
implementation of the new system) of $100. Assuming this amount is
subject to full taxation, the company tax imposed upon this income
would be $49 (49% of $100), leaving $51 available to be distributed by
the company. Should the company distribute all of this to its sole share-
holder, an individual in the highest tax bracket, then that individual
would have $100 of assessable income from the receipt of the cash divi-
dend (dividend of $51 plus imputed income of $49); however the individ-
ual would have no further income tax liability because the credit
available from the dividend would offset the marginal tax upon the distri-
bution. 6 A shareholder in a personal marginal rate below the company
tax rate would have a credit available which would reduce his tax liabil-
ity on income attributable to other sources during the year because the
tax liability upon the dividend distribution and imputed income would be
less than the tax paid by the company attributable to the distribution.
The proposals to date have indicated that such a credit would not be
available for cash refund by the Treasury, nor could it be carried forward
if unused during the year received.
company tax paid under full integration would be allowed as a credit to the shareholders upon their





Tax (at 49%) 49
Less: Credit 49
Net tax payable 0
See Company Distribution Bill supra, note 55 at § 14, proposed ITAA § 160 AQU.
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The imputation system devised in Australia, when taken in conjunc-
tion with reduction of the highest level of individual tax rates, accom-
plishes most of the desired goals of taxation policy with respect to reform
of the company tax. The changes minimize the distortion caused by dif-
ferent tax treatment of company and non-company investments by
(1) elimination of double taxation, (2) restoration of neutrality between
income from debt and equity investment, (3) maintenance of the progres-
sive tax structure for individuals without distortion for income earned
through companies, and (4) correction of the bias toward the retention of
corporate earnings. While a certain bias does remain toward the distri-
bution of company earnings in order to lower rate taxpayers (to enable
them to use credits available for the difference between their individual
rates and the company rate), this should certainly be recognized as a
minor imperfection with none of the tax avoidance implications which
are caused by many of the eliminated tax distortions.
As a result of the above changes, several statutory provisions were
no longer necessary. Most obviously, the current tax on excess retention
of profits was no longer required because of the elimination of double
taxation and the sheltering advantage to high rate individuals. The divi-
dend rebate on intercompany distributions was retained due to the dis-
tortions which would be caused by the channeling of dividends through
loss companies. A system of "franked dividends" 7 was introduced to
integrate the continued dividend rebate with the imputation system.
The end of the retention tax and alteration of the dividend rebate
resulted in the further elimination of any need to distinguish, for tax pur-
poses, between public and private companies. Although there may con-
tinue to be some difficulty with the tax treatment of both direct and
indirect distributions to shareholders, these problems may also be greatly
discounted since dividend distributions will no longer be a critical step in
tax collection, will instead be a largely inconsequential event for income
tax reasons (except for the net credit effect for distributions to low rate
individuals). The simplification of the tax system which this change en-
compasses should consequently be welcomed.58
57 Intercompany dividends which would have carried the imputation credit had they been re-
ceived by individuals would constitute franked dividends. The recipient company would not be able
to avail itself of the credit (the dividend being subject to the dividend rebate); however, dividends
paid to individuals from this source would carry the imputation credit. In this regard, see the
discussion of the qualifying dividend account, and see Company Distribution Bill supra, note 55 at
§ 14, proposed ITAA § 160 AQF.
58 Despite the diminishment of the importance of the dividend distribution for income tax
reasons under the imputation system, the problems in the classical system with the determination of
whether a distribution is an assessable dividend (see supra, text accompanying note 7) may not be
totally irrelevant. The importance of this concept may continue due both to the imposition of tax
upon distributions from non-qualifying funds under the proposed imputation system (as discussed
later) and to the introduction of a capital gains tax which does not tax fully capital profits.
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Despite the overall simplification afforded by the new full imputa-
tion system, there are several complexities to the model. The first prob-
lem arises from the possibility that distributions from the company to its
shareholders may come from income which has not been taxed at the full
company tax rate. Should this be the case, the imputation of income and
credit to the individual shareholder would overcompensate as the com-
pany tax incurred would in fact be exceeded by the credit given to all
shareholders. This problem, known as super-imputation, is handled in
various imputation systems throughout the world in a number of ways.
The Australian government initially indicated that the approach of the
United Kingdom to this problem, the advance company tax, would be
utilized. This solution, though somewhat complex in application, would
nonetheless have been much simpler in Australia than in the United
Kingdom due to Australia's alignment of the company tax and top indi-
vidual marginal tax rate and due to the full imputation used in Australia
(as opposed to the partial imputation system used in the United
Kingdom).
Under the advance company tax and the proposed Australian com-
pensatory tax, the distribution of dividends by a company to its share-
holders would have resulted in a tax liability in the company equal to the
imputed credit or income which was to be passed along to the share-
holder.59 This compensatory tax was to be allowed, however, as a credit
against the company's income tax liability incurred in the same tax year.
Thus, where a company had distributed its net earnings in the same year
as the company tax liability on that earnings become due, the company's
total tax liability will not be increased so long as the income earned by
the company was fully taxed. However, where the company had income
taxed at below the full tax rate, the imposition of the compensatory tax
resulted in an additional liability offsetting the amount of any super-im-
putation benefit.6 ° Where the compensatory tax imposed upon distribu-
tions made in a given year exceeded the company tax liability in that year
(where distributions were from prior years' earnings or where the com-
pany had lower taxable income than financial income due to tax prefer-
ences such as accelerated depreciation, for example), the credit allowed
for the compensatory tax paid was, as under the United Kingdom sys-
tem, to be available to be carried back for a limited period61 and forward
indefinitely to be offset against the company's income tax liability in
59 Thus in the example where a company has earned $100 and has paid its company tax of $49,
a distribution of $51 will cause the company to be faced with an additional tax liability, for compen-
satory tax, of $49.
60 Keating, Budget Statements of the Treasurer (1986-87).
61 The United Kingdom allowed only a two year carryback on excess advance company tax




While the imposition of the compensatory tax prevents super-impu-
tation, unfortunately it also eliminates the benefit of tax preferences given
to companies upon distribution. Consequently it provides a disincentive
to distribution of income earned by the company even though taxed at
rates below the normal company tax. For these reasons, the Australian
government announced in December, 1986, that it would not proceed
with a compensatory tax upon companies but would instead introduce a
bifurcated system. Under this system imputation would only apply to
distributions from income taxed at the full rates at the company level and
distributions from income would be taxed at less than the full company
rates assessed to shareholders upon distribution in a manner similar to
the classical system.
The Qualifying Dividend Account
The imputation system initially proposed by the Australian govern-
ment met with opposition from the Australian commercial sector in only
one area of major importance, that of the compensatory tax. Where in-
come earned by a company has not been fully taxed in the hands of the
company, allowance of the imputation credit to shareholders would re-
sult in super-imputation, as mentioned earlier, with the result that there
would be a loss of revenue without an adjustment mechanism on each
distribution of less than fully taxed earnings. While the compensatory
tax eliminated this superimputation by assuring that full tax would be
paid upon all distributions, it had the effect of eliminating preferences
given to companies upon distribution of such income to the shareholders.
The difficulty of the compensatory tax adjustment would be most notice-
able in two areas, foreign sourced income (subject to lower Australian
income tax because of credits given for foreign tax paid) and mining in-
come (subject to lower rates than normally applicable to companies). In
both circumstances, distribution to a shareholder of profits from such
sources of income would have resulted in an additional compensatory tax
liability which would raise the effective Australian company tax rate on
that income to 49%.63
On December 10, 1986, the Australian government announced that
the compensatory tax would be abandoned. In order to prevent super-
62 See Keating, supra note 60. The carryback was to be for two years and the carryforward for
an indefinite period.
63 As previously mentioned, each dividend distribution after July 1, 1987 was to subject the
company to a compensatory tax of 49/51 of the distribution (thereby assuring that any distribution
would be from fund which had been subject to a full 49% tax). Where the company tax had already
been imposed at a full 49% tax), the compensatory tax paid upon distribution could be used to offset
the company tax which was due during that or subsequent years or would give rise to a refund for
company tax paid in the prior two years (where such years were subsequent to July 1, 1987).
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imputation, the government announced that only such company earnings
as had been subject to a full 49% company tax will carry the imputation
credit to shareholders. Company earnings upon which no company tax
had been paid would be subject to tax to the shareholders at face value
with no imputation component (thus eliminating super-imputation and
assuring that earnings are taxed at either the company or shareholder
level). In order to implement this proposal, each Australian company
will be required, after June 30, 1987, to maintain a qualifying dividends
account. This account will record the amount of income retained in the
company which has borne the full company tax,' such figure to be cal-
culated by reference to the company tax paid.65 Additionally, intercom-
pany dividends paid to a shareholding company from the declaring
company's qualifying dividends account (known as "franked" dividends)
are to be added to the recipient company's qualifying dividends
account.66
A company declaring dividends from its qualifying dividends ac-
count must reduce the account accordingly. Any non-corporate share-
holder receiving such dividend will be entitled to the benefit of the
imputation credit on such dividend received, thus effectively allowing the
company tax paid to be considered as a prepayment for the shareholder's
tax liability on the distribution. After a company distributes its entire
Neither the exact timing of the compensatory tax liability nor the mechanisms for refund had been
finalized prior to the abandonment of the compensatory tax.
Interestingly, companies with offshore earnings may have been subjected to total tax in excess of
even 49%. Although the Australian company income tax now provides for a credit for foreign
income taxes paid, the compensatory tax would have been capable of offset against only the Austra-
lian company tax actually paid. Thus, the benefit of the foreign tax credit would have been lost upon
distribution, raising the total Australian tax incidence to 49% in addition to the offshore tax.
64 The account would operate prospectively so that income taxed prior to July 1, 1987 would
not be included in the qualifying dividend account. The imputation system will effectively apply
only to post-July 1, 1987 income earned by the company if fully taxed.
65 Announcement by Mr. Keating, Statement of the Treasurer (Dec. 10, 1986) [Hereinafter
Keating Announcement].
"The amount added to the QDA in a year of income is therefore derived by the fol-
lowing formula:
(51/49) T + D
where:
T is the Australian company tax paid by the company in the relevant period;
D is the amount of any franked dividends received by the company from other
resident companies in the period."
This avoids the difficulty of income on which tax has been paid, but at a rate lower than 49%.
By multiplying the Australian company tax paid after July 1, 1987, by 51/49 in order to find the
appropriate addition to the qualifying dividend account, the components of a company's income are
simplified into that on which full tax has been paid and that on which no tax has been paid.
66 Intercompany dividends will continue to be non-assessable under ITAA § 46. Of course, the
recipient company shall receive no imputation benefit other than the inclusion of the dividend re-
ceived in the qualifying dividends account.
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qualifying dividends account,6" any further distribution (known as "un-
franked" dividends) will be taxed to the shareholders without benefit of
the imputation credit. 68 The qualifying dividend account may remain in
the positive indefinitely; however, should the account be in the negative
at the end of the tax year,69 a tax payment (similar to the compensatory
tax) will be required to restore the account to the positive.70
International Tax Implications
As with most imputation systems in place worldwide, the Australian
imputation system proposed in September, 1985 applies only to coordi-
nate the taxation of resident companies and their resident shareholders.
While this principle was mentioned briefly in the announcement of the
introduction of the Australian imputation system, the complexities of its
application have only recently been addressed. Further, the discrimina-
tory treatment of residents, which the Australian system includes, will
undoubtedly lead to difficulties of renegotiating tax treaties which cur-
rently prohibit discrimination against residents of the signatory states.
With the abandonment of the compensatory tax and the introduc-
tion of the qualifying dividend account, many of the international
problems caused by the introduction of imputation have been avoided.
Retention of the withholding tax for distributions from other than the
qualifying dividend account assures that taxation of non-resident share-
holders will also be maintained.71 In adopting the bifurcated approach to
67 All dividends were to be treated as being paid first out of the qualifying dividends account
according to the Keating Announcement, supra note 65. The Company Distributions Bill supra,
note 55 at § 14, proposed ITAA § 160 AQF appears to allow greater flexibility in dividend policy.
68 The announcement contemplates a pro-rating of the dividends paid from the qualifying divi-
dend account where the company has an advance and fixed commitment to pay dividends on partic-
ular classes of shares (cf Company Distribution Bill supra, note 55 at § 14, proposed ITAA § 160
AQG).
69 This would occur where, for example, a company distributes excess qualifying dividends to
its shareholders than are in its qualifying dividend account. See Company Distribution Bill supra,
note 55 at § 14, proposed ITAA § 160 AQJ. Presumably, it is easier to require a correction by the
company than an amendment altering each shareholder's position as a result of the excess distribu-
tion. For this reason, corrections to a company's tax liability for prior years shall not result in
alterations or amendments to the shareholders, but may result in a compensating payment at the tax
year and if the reduction in the company's tax liability for prior years is greater than its current
year's liability (thus leaving it with a negative balance in its qualifying dividend account at year-end).
70 Requiring a company to incur this liability only at the end of the year enables a company to
estimate taxable income and dividend receipts for each year from which franked dividends may be
paid. Should a payment be required at the end of the year due to miscalculation, the payment will be
available as an off-set against company tax, with no addition to the qualifying dividend account on
the income to which the off-set applies. Company Distributions Bill, supra note 55 at § 14, proposed
ITAA § 160 AQK.
71 In the Keating Announcement, supra note 65, the Australian government partially retracted
its July 28, 1986 undertaking to repeal the dividend withholding tax and branch profits tax. The
repeal of both of these taxes were offered in conjunction with the imposition of the compensatory tax
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imputation in December, 1986, the Australian government has effectively
provided a reduction of the total incidence of taxation on corporate in-
vestment internally with minimal loss of revenue from non-resident in-
vestors. The qualifying dividend account will result in the taxation of
international transactions in the following way:
(a) Resident Companies
Resident companies will continue to be taxed on all income,
whatever its source, on the basis of its Australian residence. An Austra-
lian resident company with ex-Australian source income will, under the
newly introduced foreign tax credit, face a lower incidence of Australian
income tax due to the credit now allowed for foreign taxes paid. Only
that portion of income for which the Australian tax paid would represent
a full levy of income tax would be included in the qualifying dividend
account .72 Distribution to resident shareholders would, as previously
mentioned, qualify for the imputation credit if the distribution were from
the qualifying dividend account but would be taxable in the hands of the
shareholder without benefit of the credit if the distribution were not a
qualified dividend. This system would limit the benefit of relief from
double taxation of company and shareholders only to so much of foreign
income as could be determined to be subject to full Australian taxation,
with the result that foreign income effectively taxed offshore would still
be subject to two levels of tax, foreign tax at the company level and Aus-
tralian tax at the individual level.7 3
Dividends to non-resident shareholders would likewise be taxed ac-
cording to whether they came from the qualifying dividend account.
Those qualified dividends paid to non-residents would be subject to no
further taxation,74 but any excess imputation credit would not apply
in order to maintain the overall tax burden upon those not subject to the imputation system, non-
resident shareholders, who would suffer from the increase in the total company taxes upon distrib-
uted income from a maximum 46% (less with preferentially taxed income) to 49% (company tax
and compensatory tax raising the effective total tax to this percentage on all income distributed).
With the abandonment of the compensatory tax, distributions from preferential income items would
probably escape the Australian tax net totally without the imposition of the withholding tax. The
withholding tax on non-qualifying dividends was thus retained with distributions from income al-
ready taxed at 49% avoiding such tax as previously planned (Company Distributions Bill supra, note
55 at § 11). The branch profits tax, however, will be completely abolished from July 1, 1987.
72 According to the Keating Announcement, supra note 65, the amount to be included in the
qualifying dividend account in each period (other than from franked dividends received) is calcu-
lated with regard only to "Australian company tax paid." See Company Distributions Bill § 14,
proposed ITAA §§ 160 APK - 160 APV, particularly § 160 APT.
73 See also Vann and Parsons, The Foreign Tax Credit and Reform of International Taxation, 3
Australian Tax Forum 131 (1986).
74 Keating Announcement, supra note 65.
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(thereby discriminating in favor of resident shareholders).75 Dividends
to non-resident shareholders which were not from the qualifying divi-
dend account would attract a dividend withholding tax, but then the re-
cipient would not be subject to further assessment by Australian
authorities. These proposals allow income subjected to full tax under the
Australian company tax to be distributed without further tax at the indi-
vidual level while assuring that income not fully taxed would not fully
escape Australian taxation by subjecting it to the dividend withholding
tax prior to payment to non-residents.
(b) Non-Resident Companies
The current proposals for the Australian imputation system do not
make allowance for imputation to apply to distributions from non-resi-
dent companies. Where Australian source income is earned by a non-
resident company, and is thus subject to full Australian taxation, a distri-
bution to a resident shareholder might arguably be one which should be
subject to relief from the double taxation by Australian authorities. 76
Unfortunately, however, the obvious administrative difficulties which
would be necessitated by provision of such relief makes the application of
the imputation system to such transactions impractical. Consequently,
all earnings through non-resident Australian companies will be subject to
taxation without resort to imputation.
Treaty Complications
The new imputation system will result in a loss of revenue of be-
tween Aus $75 and Aus $300 million per annum according to Treasury
estimates.7 7 It is not surprising then that its benefits are limited to resi-
dent taxpayers. Under the classical system in force prior to July 1, 1987,
income distributed to a foreign shareholder in an Australian company
would have been subjected to a tax at the company level of 46%. Addi-
tionally, the distributions from the company to the foreign shareholder
would then be subject to a withholding tax of 15% or 30% depending
upon whether the shareholder's country has a double tax treaty with
Australia.7" Allowance of the imputation credit to a foreign shareholder
75 No refund based upon the excess imputation credit will be allowed to resident or non-resi-
dent shareholders according to Treasury announcements. While this is non-discriminatory on its
face, its effect will be to discriminate against non-resident shareholders who would be less likely to
have other types of income against which to use the excess imputation credit.
76 This point if forcefully presented in Vann, International Implications ofImputation, 2 Aus-
tralian Tax Forum 451 (1986).
77 According to the September, 1985, announcement by Mr. Keating of the new tax package,
the cost was estimated to be Aus$ 75 million. This was increased in the Keating Announcement
supra note 65, to Aus$ 300 million.
78 See ITAA Division 1 lA.
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would eliminate the company tax for foreign-owned companies, 9 with
only the withholding tax imposed upon distributions to non-resident
shareholders. Although the administrative difficulties which resulted
from a foreign shareholder's accumulation of net tax credits was elimi-
nated by the general prohibition of cash refunds or carryovers of excess
imputation credits, the reduction of tax revenue from the current 46%
plus 15% of distributions to foreign shareholders (or 30% of distribu-
tions where no treaty exists) to a mere 15% or 30% of the amount dis-
tributed was undesirable.
Preventing the application of imputation credit to foreign sharehold-
ers will assure that income from such investments will be taxed at the
applicable Australian company tax rate (normally 49%) or to the divi-
dend withholding tax upon distribution where full company tax has not
been imposed, because of preferences, at the company level. However,
most of the tax treaties which Australia has with foreign countries re-
quire no harsher treatment in the taxation of the nationals of these coun-
tries than is afforded Australian residents, 0 and renegotiation of these
treaties may be necessary due to the discriminatory treatment of residen-
tial shareholders under the imputation system."1 Of particular concern is
the treaty with the United States, which not only is a major capital ex-
porter to Australia, but which has also been a difficult negotiator in its
dealings with other countries where an imputation system has been intro-
duced and whose benefits are not extended to United States residents. 82
The difficulties which Australia will face in the transition to an im-
putation system can be seen by examination of the experiences of West
Germany, France, the United Kingdom8 3 and Canada. 4 Each of these
countries encountered international repercussions, particularly with the
United States, upon their own abandonment of the classical system of
corporate taxation."5 When corporate income was taxed under classical
systems in most countries, income from transnational corporate invest-
ment had been effectively allocated by consideration of the company and
its shareholders separately. While concessions in the international taxing
79 But only if such credits could be refunded or applied to other tax liabilities.
80 See, e.g. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Aug. 6, 1982, United States-
Australia, art. 23, T.I.A.S. No. 10773. O'Brien, The Nondiscrimination Article in Tax Treaties, 10
LAW & POLICY IN INTL. Bus. 545 (1978).
81 See e.g. Krever, Tax Reform in Australia: Base Broadening Down Under, 34 CAN. TAX. J.
346 (1986).
82 See Vann, supra note 76, at 474-79.
83 Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COL. L. REv. 1151 (1981). See also
Ault, International Issues in Corporate Tax Integration, 10 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 461 (1978)
and Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experience, 31 TAX LAWYER 65 (1977).
84 Krever, supra note 81, and Kingson, supra note 83, at 1255-62.
85 See Rosenweig, United States International Tax Treaty Policy with respect to Foreign Imputa-
tion Systems of Corporate-Shareholder Taxation, 13 N.Y.U.J. INTL. LAW AND POLITICS 729 (1981).
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scheme were often allowed for corporate direct investment in the country
of the corporate investor's residence, the classical system provided easy
demarcation in the ordinary case with company income being subject to
tax at the company's residence and distribution to foreign shareholders
being subject to tax again by the country of each shareholder's residence.
Treaty limitations on the incidence of tax upon distributions to foreign
shareholders assured that foreign investors would not suffer a disadvan-
tage through double tax on distributions. This was reinforced by domes-
tic credits for foreign withholding tax and by non-discrimination treaty
articles.
With the West German introduction of a split rate system in 1953,
the tax imposed by West Germany upon corporations depended upon
whether the income was retained or distributed by the corporation. Due
to the loss of revenue which the lower rate would cause when such distri-
butions were made to foreign shareholders, the West German govern-
ment generally negotiated an increase in the dividend withholding to tax
at 25% (to offset the 20% differential between distributed and non-dis-
tributed income). This increase was not, however, accepted by the
United States or Canada, both of which were successful in retaining a
15% withholding tax in their tax treaties. 8
6
In 1977, the West German government introduced an imputation
system which retained certain aspects of its former split rate system. Un-
distributed profits continued to be taxed at a higher rate than distributed
profits, but the tax on distributed profits became available as a credit for
each shareholder's personal tax liability. This credit on distribution has
not been allowed to foreign shareholders and, additionally, the withhold-
ing tax of 25% been retained on the grounds that the reduced corporate
tax rate for distributed corporate income needs to be offset under the
imputation system, as under the former split rate system.8 7 The West
German change from a split rate system to an imputation system, how-
ever, had the effect of redressing the advantage obtained by foreign share-
holders due to the interaction of the tax treaties with the split rate
system. The strength of the West German bargaining position as a capi-
tal, self-sufficient country, coupled with prior United States intransi-
gence, enabled West Germany to avoid making the imputation credit
available to foreign shareholders.88
In 1965, France introduced an imputation system allowing for a
partial credit for corporate tax paid upon distribution of profits to share-
86 See Tillinghast, The Revision of the Income Tax Convention between the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany, 21 TAX L. REv. 399 (1966).
87 See Ault, Germany: The New Corporation Tax System, 8 INTERTAX 262 (1976). This sys-
tem is also discussed in Kingson, supra note 83, Gourevitch, supra note 83, and in K. LAHEY AND S.
SALTER, IMPUTATION ALTERNATIVES FOR AUSTRALIA, supra note 43.
88 See Kingson, supra note 83, at 1210-14.
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holders.89 The benefit of this credit was not extended by statute to for-
eign shareholders but concessions were made in 1968, under pressure
from France's European Community partners, to allow the credit to
portfolio investors. 9° United States investors benefited from these con-
cessions as the United States was able to have the same terms given by
France to its European partners (particularly West Germany) applied for
the benefit of United States residents. The distinction between portfolio
and direct investment by companies has been effectively retained through
treaty provisions by allowing the credit to shareholders who are taxed on
the dividend and do not qualify either for an exemption or for credit
relief for foreign corporate taxes under their domestic tax systems.91
The United Kingdom, with an imputation system similar to that of
France,92 was the first country to provide the imputation credit directly
to United States residents. The United Kingdom allowed the imputation
credit to foreign portfolio investors from the onset of their system.93 In
the 1975 United States/United Kingdom treaty, however, the benefit of
the imputation credit was extended to all investors.94 The generosity of
the United Kingdom position, which even allows for refunds on the basis
of an excess credit, may be attributable as much to the desire for external
capital95 as to the diligence of its trading partners in their tax
negotiations.
The difficulties faced by Australia in limiting the benefit of the impu-
tation credit to foreign investors, particularly from the United States, is
usefully illustrated by reference to the Canadian experience.96 As they
had successfully done indirectly with France and directly with the
United Kingdom, the United States authorities sought to have the benefit
of the Canadian imputation credit applied to United States residents
upon the introduction of the Canadian imputation system. The Cana-
dian negotiators were able to successfully prevent the imputation credit
from applying to United States nationals by maintaining that their sys-
89 See Norr, The French Reform of Dividend Taxation and Common Market Harmonization,
28 TAX LAWYER'73 (1974).
90 Portfolio investment, though defined differently in various treaties, usually includes invest-
ment by foreign corporate shareholders holding less than ten percent of the shares in a domestic
corporation as well as investment by foreign individual shareholders.
91 See Ault, supra note 87, at 473-74.
92 See Chown and Rowland, The Finance Bill - The Reform of Corporation Tax, BRIT. TAX.
REv. 133 (1972).
93 Finance Act (U.K. 1972) § 98.
94 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Oct. 9, 1978, United States-United King-
dom, art. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 9580. Only one half of the credit benefit, however, is allowed direct
investors. The relationship between the British imputation system and the United States tax laws is
discussed in Kingson, supra note 83, at 1214-17.
95 Kingson, supra note 83, at 1207.
96 Krever, supra note 81, at 386.
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tern was intended more to promote Canadian share investment than to
correlate the corporate and individual tax rates.97 This argument was
strengthened by the lack, in Canada, of any compensating mechanism for
super-imputation as found in West Germany, France and the United
Kingdom. The United States' compliance with Canada's request in this
regard may partially be explained by the special relationship between the
two countries; however, academic criticism of the American conces-
sions98 make the prospect of similar Australian success even less likely.
Differences between the Canadian and Australian systems for com-
pany/shareholder taxation accentuate the clear relationship in Australia
between the company tax and the shareholder credit which was absent in
Canada. The Australian imputation system, as originally proposed, in-
cluded a compensatory tax which served to distinguish it from the Cana-
dian system. The December, 1986 proposal to allow imputation credits
only to distributions from income which has borne full tax makes an
assertion that the imputation credit in Australia is a subsidy for Austra-
lian investment rather than an attempt to correlate the tax on companies
and shareholders even less plausible than the Canadian submission. It is
for these reasons that the reduction of both the withholding tax and the
branch profits tax on distribution which, for Australian residents, would
have carried the imputation credit, must be partially attributed to Aus-
tralian concern with the position of the United States on the discrimina-
tion issue.99 Whether these concessions will satisfy the Australian treaty
partners so as to forego the imputation credit for their resident share-
holders remains to be seen. Whatever the outcome, overseas investors
nevertheless face a lower total Australian tax burden on corporate in-
come because of the reduction of dividend withholding tax and branch
profits tax, even though the full benefit provided Australian shareholders
by the imputation system may not be realized.
CONCLUSION
The changes in the Australian tax system institutedI on July 1, 1987,
will undoubtedly bring direct benefits to foreign investors in Australian
companies, and may also, thereby, benefit Australia itself by enticing
greater foreign capital investment into the country. Admittedly, each
Australian company will now be subject to a 49% company tax and will
consequently have less after-tax profits to reinvest should accumulation
of earnings be desired; however Australian companies which have poli-
cies of high distributions of earnings will be more attractive to foreign
97 Krever, supra note 81, at 386. See also Burge and Brown, Negotiations for a New Tax Treaty
Between Canada and the United States - A Long Story, 27 CAN. TAX J. 94 (1979).
98 See Kingson, supra note 83, at 1255-62.
99 See Vann, supra note 76, at 468-74.
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investors, including those from the United States, whatever the outcome
of United States/Australia tax negotiations. Income earned through
Australian companies will now be subject at most to the 49% company
tax for foreign shareholders, representing a tax increase of 3% on com-
pany earnings which is more than amply offset by the elimination, in
most cases, of the withholding tax on dividend distributions. Likewise,
because of the abandonment of the compensatory tax mechanism, Aus-
tralian companies which benefit from the preferential treatment afforded
certain types of income will continue to be attractive notwithstanding the
introduction of the new imputation system.
More importantly, the new Australian system for the taxation of
companies and shareholders, though perhaps merely a variation on the
European theme, provides several useful innovations for the coordination
of company and shareholder taxation. The alignment of the highest indi-
vidual tax rate with the company tax rate, in conjunction with the provi-
sion of full imputation benefits on distributions from fully-taxed
company income, eliminates, with laudable success, the distorting effects
of the Australian tax on company investment. Unfortunately, conces-
sions to erosion of the revenue base have resulted in certain theoretical
imperfections in the imputation model employed. Limitations on the use
of excess imputation credits, retention of double taxation for certain pref-
erential income items, and the maintenance of the highly favorable treat-
ment of capital gains all provide tax biases which will distort the purely
commercial considerations relating to the use of companies. In spite of
these compromises, the correlation of the company and shareholder taxa-
tion achieved in the Australian model presents new perspectives on the
company/shareholder taxation reform debate which warrant
consideration.
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